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PROCEEDINGS

Wilford Mcru1. , u.r'i appeals fr^n- ir: r i->r >-

;

. £

Motion to Suppress the presentation cf evidence jbtair.eo

subsequent to an investigatory stop.

Upon stipulation of the

prosecutor, a conditional plea was entered in the Third
Circuit Court after the Honorable Judge Paul Grant
respectfully denied Defendant's Motion.

The prosecution

agreed to the conditional plea with the understanding that the
right to appeal Judge Grant's denial of the Motion to
Suppress was reserved.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
Did the arresting officer have specific articulable facts
known to him at the time he stopped defendant's vehicle such
that a reasonable person would conclude the defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
United States Constitution Fourth Amendment.
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 14.
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15.
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-24 (2).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant appeals from a criminal conviction in the
2

Circuit Court.

The conviction was based upon a stipulated

conditional plea of guilty.

II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Circuit Court denied defendant's Motion to Suppress
after an evidentiary hearing, which was held prior to trial on
December 29, 1989.

The parties then stipulated defendant

could enter a conditional plea of guilty and preserve his
rights to appeal.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

and the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress and
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence was entered on February
1, 1990.

Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on February

12, 1990.

III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Defendant was convicted of driving while under the
influence of alcohol and operating a motor vehicle without a
valid license after entering a conditional guilty plea.

The

plea was conditional in order to preserve his right to appeal
challenging the Court's denial of his pretrial Motion to
Suppress all evidence due to an illegal traffic stop.

See,

Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989)
(citing State v. S e w , 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1987)).
3

The Court made specific findings concerning the conditional
plea.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 27, 1989, a Salt Lake City police officer
pulled up next to Defendant's vehicle on 200 West and 900
South while the light was red.
6, hereafter T.6).

(See Trial Transcript, page

When the light changed to green, the

Defendant's car did not move for approximately thirty (30)
seconds and then proceeded to go through the light.

(T.6)

The officer stopped the vehicle and parked behind it.

(T.6)

The stop was not based on any sort of driving pattern or
other conduct.

(T.ll)

After the officer stopped the vehicle, the officer
approached the Defendant's vehicle, which moved in reverse
toward the officer's vehicle and then abruptly stopped.
(T.18)

The Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving

under the influence of alcohol and driving without an
operator's permit.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The police officer's stop of Defendant was a "seizure"
subject to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
4

Constitution.

An investigatory stop can be justified only

upon a showing of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Mr. McCullough had committed or was committing a crime or that
he was stopped incident to a traffic offense.

The officer

could not reasonably suspect from the facts apparent to the
officer at the time of the stop and from reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts that Mr. McCullough was driving while
intoxicated.

The mere fact that the vehicle remained stopped

at a traffic signal for 30 seconds after it turned green did
not provide sufficient reasonable suspicion to seize Mr.
McCullough.

As there were no objective facts upon which the

officer could base a reasonable suspicion that Mr. McCullough
was driving while intoxicated at the time of the stop, the
investigatory stop was illegal and any evidence derived
therefrom should have been suppressed pursuant to Mr.
McCullough's pretrial Motion.

ARGUMENT
OBJECTIVE FACTS APPARENT TO THE OFFICER
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO REASONABLY SUSPECT
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INTOXICATED AT THE
TIME OF THE INVESTIGATORY STOP.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
5

Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated....
The police officer's stop of the Defendant was a
"seizure" subject to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and to Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and absent certain limited exceptions to the
warrant requirement, a warrantless seizure is presumptively
unreasonable.

See, Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443

(1971) .
In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment'applies to seizures
of the person, including brief
investigatory stops such as the stop of
the vehicle here. Reid v. Georgia, 448
U.S. 438, 440 (1980); Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968). An
investigatory stop must be justified by
some objective manifestation that the
person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity. Brown v._
Texas, 443, U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979);
United States v. Briqnoni-Pronce, supra,
at 884; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
146-149 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at
16-19.
The standard for investigatory stops is codified in Utah
Code Annotated Section 77-7-15:
6

A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing a public
offense.... (emphasis added)
Thus, an investigatory stop can be justified only upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had
committed or was committing a crime or that he was stopped
incident to a traffic offense.

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2 972,

975 (Utah App. 1988) .
Hence, both the Legislature and the Courts adhere to the
standard that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion to
believe an individual has committed or is in the act of
committing a crime.

The reasonable suspicion must be

articulable, meaning the officer must be able to explain the
reasonable suspicion to others.

In State v. Baumqaertel, 762

P.2d 2, 4 (Utah App. 1988) (citing State v. Truiillo, 739
P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)), this court stated:
To justify an "investigatory stop" or
"seizure" that falls short of an official
arrest, a peace officer "must point to
specific, articulable facts which,
together with rational inferences drawn
from those facts, would lead a reasonable
person to conclude (the suspect) had
committed or was about to commit a crime.
Reasonable suspicion that a Defendant was intoxicated
must be based upon facts apparent to the officer and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom for the officer to
7

reasonably suspect intoxication.

Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778

P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Baird, 763
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988)).

Reasonable suspicion must

be based upon articulated, "objective facts" apparent to the
officer at the time of the stop.

Thorsness, at 1012.

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989).

(Cf.

Therefore,

the test for an investigatory stop is based "not on the
policeman's subjective theory, but whether the record
discloses articulable objective facts were available to the
officer to justify the stop."

State v. Peck, 329 N.W.2d

680, 686 (Iowa 1982) .
The case of Sandy City v. Thorsnessr 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah
App. 1989) is on point.

In that case, a Sandy City police

officer stopped an individual because it was late at night,
1:30 a.m., the Defendant drove slowly in the inside lane and
stopped alongside the officer's car failing to immediately
move on when signaled to do so by the officer.

This Court

found that while the conduct may be indicative of a drunken
driver when combined with other factors, such behavior was
equally consistent with the habits and conduct of a normal
driver.

Thorsness at 1012.

The officer in this case indicated that the only act of
Mr. McCullough, observed by the officer prior to the stop,
8

pertained to Mr. McCullough's not moving through the green
light for thirty (30) seconds after it had changed to a green
light. (T.17)

Under Utah Law pertaining to traffic and

control signals, vehicular traffic facing a green signal may
proceed:
"(2) "Green" indicates:
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a circular
green signal may proceed straight through
or turn right or left unless a sign at
that place prohibits either turn...."
U.C.A. Section 41-6-24 (2) (emphasis added).
Defendant was not committing a traffic offense by not
proceeding through the green light immediately.

Such behavior

is as equally consistent with the habits and conduct of a
normal driver momentarily distracted as it is with that of a
driver who is violating the law.
The officer indicated in his testimony that he did not
base the stop on any sort of driving pattern or any other
conduct observed.

(T.ll)

The officer also indicated that

after he had made the stop, Defendant's vehicle rolled back
toward the officer's vehicle.

(T.18)

The officer admitted in

testimony that the vehicle could have reversed due to
mechanical difficulties.

(T.19)

The Defendant in this case was stopped solely on
the basis of the fact that he did not proceed through the
9

green light for thirty (30) seconds after it had changed from
red.
Defendant's prolonged stop at the traffic light did not
indicate a reckless, erratic driving pattern indicating a
lack of vehicular control (T.ll) nor did it violate Utah Law
regarding traffic control signals.

The facts of this case

are equally indicative of innocent behavior and without
objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion, do not
provide a reasonable basis to suspect Defendant was
intoxicated.

No evidence exists for a reasonable suspicion

based upon articulated, "objective facts".

Therefore, the

police officer's stop of Mr. McCullough was a "seizure"
subject to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and without reasonable suspicion, as articulated
in Terry and Utah case law, subsequent evidence resulting in
conviction should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully
requests that the Trial Court's conviction of Defendant after
the denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
pursuant to the traffic stop be reversed.
10

Evidence obtained

subsequent to the unlawful seizure should be suppressed and
excluded and the case remanded to the trial court for
appropriate disposition.
Dated this

£<J

&}

day of

r(l

1990.

Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICE OF PHILLIP W. DYER
& ASSOCIATES

Phillip W. Dyer
C3?—
Pamela C. Urry
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the following party on the

27th

day of

April, 1990.
Glen Cook
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
DATED this

^-7

day of

f?

:0

1990.

LAW OFFICE OF PHILLIP W. DYER
AND ASSOCIATES

C2. ,^

CJL. n

Phillip
W. Dyer O
^Tsx—
Pamela C. Urry
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant

MI/B:McCullough.bri/PWDl

12

FILED
MAY

1 WO

COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
i

Case NO.900100-CA

i

Priority

Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
WILFORD LYNN McCULLOUGH,

2.0

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE PAUL GRANT PRESIDING.

GLEN COOK, ESQ.
SALT LAKE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ.
PAMELA C. URRY, ESQ.
DYER & ASSOCIATES
318 Reams Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Appellant

(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook)
A.

West patrol division.

Q.

Fine.

Was your attention directed toward a

Chevy truck, 1973, blue over white?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

What first attracted your attention to that

vehicle?
A.

I don't —

I pulled up next to it, I believe

it was 200 West and 900 South, and

—

Q.

And --

A.

—

the light

Q.

—

what color was the light at that time?

A.

The light was red at that time.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

Okay.

—

Did the light change to green?

What did the other car do when the light

changed to green?
A.

It did not move.

Q.

Can you estimate approximately how long it

didn't move at the green light?
A.

I estimated 30 seconds.

Q.

Did the vehicle then go through the light?

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

What action then did you take?

A.

I stopped the vehicle.

Got behind it and

called on the radio that I would be stopping the

Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer)
violation before?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

Okay.

Based on your observation of the

defendant waiting at that light, did you believe that he
may have been impaired by the time —

based on

the time that he took to go through the light?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Nothing further of the witness, your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. DYER:
Q.

Officer, is it your testimony then, as I

understand it, that the basis for your investigation was
the length of time that the vehicle was stopped at the
intersection; is that correct?
A.

That's what initiated the investigation,

that's not the basis of the rest of the investigation.
Q.

Okay, I'm with you.

But that's the —

that

is the basis upon which you decided to stop
Mr. McCullough's vehicle, correct?

There was -- you

didn't base it on any sort of a driving pattern or any
other conduct that you observed?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And also is your testimony, if I'm not

correct, that you said it is a violation of law to not
11
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer)
would be with unlawful conduct; is that not true?
A.

You mean lawful conduct --

Q.

Yes.

A.

-- as unlawful conduct?

Q.

Correct.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did the fact —

by the way, what time of day

did this occur?
A.

It was around 10 to 1.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Right, 50 minutes after.

Q.

Did that impact on your decision?

A.

It may have, I don't recall for sure.

Q.

So the only facts that impacted on your

So it was just after midnight then?

decision to pull the vehicle over was the fact of the 30
second delay in proceeding through the intersection?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay, and once that vehicle had proceeded

through at that point in time, you made the decision
based on the information you had that you felt there was
sufficient basis to pull the vehicle over?
A.

Correct.

Q.

After the vehicle was pulled over and you

contacted the driver, were any field sobriety tests
performed?
17
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer)
A.

I demonstrated one.

He declined to do it on

the basis that he was too drunk to pass it.
MR. DYER:

Your Honor, I would move to strike

the response as being nonresponsive.
MR. COOK:

Appears

—

MR. DYER:

The question called for a yes or no

MR. COOK:

Appeared to be responsive to us,

answer.

your Honor.
THE COURT:
Q.

I sustain.

And based on your observations of the 30

second stop at the intersection, and the smell of
alcohol on the individual's person and his appearance,
that was your probable cause for arrest; is that
correct?
A.

No.

Q.

What additional facts did you have to give

rise to probable cause for arrest?
A.

The fact that he pulled to the curb okay, and

I was approximately a car length behind him; I stopped
my vehicle and was on my way out of my vehicle to
approach his when his vehicle, in reverse, started
towards my vehicle.
Without stopping the vehicle which was rolling
towards my vehicle, he put it in park.

And you could
18

Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Redirect by Cook)
see the, you know, the instantaneous stop when he
dropped from reverse into park,
Q.

Is that particular driving conduct consistent

with a transmission problem?
A.

I don't know, I've never had a transmission

problem like that before.
Q.

Is it possible it could be consistent with a

transmission that won't

—

A.

Well

—

Q.

-- go into gear?

A.

I imagine it could be possible.
MR. DYER:

That's all I have, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. COOK:
Q.

To be clear, officer, you considered a number

of factors before you placed the defendant under arrest;
is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

You mentioned previously slurred speech?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Poor balance?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Odor of alcohol?

A.

Yes.
19
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